Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints by Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts
ISSN 1183-1057 
 
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY 
 











Plea Bargaining with 
Budgetary Constraints 
 
















   Economics 






Abstract: In this paper, we construct a simple model that illustrates a perverse
eﬀect associated with plea bargaining in which an increase in sanctions can lead to
reduced deterrence. This ﬁnding is derived from the interaction of binding budgetary
constraints and plea bargaining. In an environment with these institutional features,
higher sanctions are not always optimal when resources are limited, even if such sanc-
tions are costless. Such potential phenomena may be useful in explaining the fact
that many states have introduced limitations on plea bargaining. Career-concerned
prosecutors are necessary for such a result to be present.
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In the present U.S. judicial system, few criminal cases are determined by trial. In fact,
approximately 90% of cases are resolved by guilty pleas.1 Although television has
popularized the idea that many plea bargains are made in exchange for information,
the large majority of the plea bargains in reality are done to save resources. As
highlighted by Fisher (2000) or Landes (1971), because of severe budgetary pressure on
prosecutors, this method of resolving cases is viewed as an essential tool for managing
large case loads. Plea bargaining saves money, or perhaps we should more precisely say
that it saves time, by reducing the time spent in court by both prosecutors and judges.
Court time is often seen as the most signiﬁcant constraint to a smoothly functioning
legal system. In fact, empirical evidence, dating as early as Alshuler (1968), reveals
that plea bargaining became more prevalent as these types of constraints became more
binding.
Despite these advantages, there is large opposition to plea bargaining. In a 2004 memo
on sentencing to all federal prosecutors, the Justice Department imposed restrictions
on plea bargaining.2 Five states3 have partial bans on plea bargaining, while eleven
states4 have some form of restrictions. In 1975, Alaska even introduced a total ban on
plea bargaining.5 Some lobby groups like Mother’s Against Drunk Driving (MADD)
1 United States Sentencing Commission Data. Resolved cases are deﬁned as those dealt
with by guilty plea, dismissal or trial.
2 See the memo (http://news.ﬁndlaw.com/ hdocs/docs/doj/ashcroft92203chrgmem.pdf)
by Attorney General J. Ashcroft. In his memo, Ashcroft stated that it is a prosecutor’s
duty “to charge and to prove the most serious, readily provable oﬀense.” Plea-bargaining
is only admissible if it is consistent with such goal.
3 CA, FL, MI, OR and PA.
4 A Z ,A R ,C O ,K S ,K Y ,M E ,M S ,N M ,N Ya n dW Y .
5 Rubinstein and White (1979) mention that even if formal plea bargaining is banned, some
bargaining takes place in the form of oﬀense bargaining, where the type of oﬀense charged
is what is bargained one. They show that, following Alaska’s ban on plea bargaining,
sentences for Class 3 (burglary, larceny, etc) increased by 53%, while sentences for Class 4
(Fraud, forgery, etc) and Class 5 (drug felonies) increased by 117% and 223% respectively.
This suggests that reduced sanctions were a consequence of plea bargaining. The Alaskan
Judicial Council (1991) concluded (http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Reports/pleaframe.htm)
1advocate for a total ban of plea bargaining in drinking and driving cases. According
to Fisher (2000), people are concerned that plea bargaining is unfair and undermines
the legitimacy of the legal system.
In this paper, we demonstrate that plea bargaining may introduce some perverse out-
comes. In particular, counter-intuitively in an environment with plea bargaining, in-
creasing sanctions can lead to more crime when the prosecutor is resource constrained.
In other words, excessive use of plea bargaining can reduce the eﬀectiveness of higher
sanctions.
Increased penalties have long been believed to be a crucial strategy for decreasing
the incentives to commit crime, and thereby, reducing the level of crime. However,
empirical evidence casts some doubt on the responsiveness of criminal activities to
changes in sanctions.6 There is a long literature addressing the relative ineﬀectiveness
of sanctions. Stigler (1970) and Mookherjee and Png (1994) argue that extreme sanc-
tions reduce marginal deterrence, and thus encourage criminals to commit crimes that
are more severe, or to commit crimes more intensely. Malik (1990) argues that crim-
inals increase expenditure on socially wasteful avoidance activities as sentences rise.
Andreoni (1991) shows that the probability of conviction may fall as sentences rise if
jurors use a reasonable doubt test. A similar argument can be generated by an insti-
tutional feature: Prosecutors with restricted resources may make plea bargains with
defendants. This paper suggests that, in the presence of resource–constrained prose-
cutors who enter into plea bargains to relax these constraints, the presence of these
agreements can diminish, or even completely oﬀset the deterrence eﬀect of increased
legislated sanctions.
In this paper, we construct a simple model that incorporates a constrained prosecutor
that even if some bargaining actually continues to take place in Alaska for budgetary
reasons, it is seriously limited in eﬀect.
6 Ehrlich (1996) discusses these empirical ﬁndings on deterrence. He also discusses many
issues in this empirical work including identiﬁcation issues, mismeasurement of data,
and diﬃculties in separating incapacitation and deterrence eﬀects. Although empirical
issues make these results diﬃcult to judge, the ﬁndings still do suggest an small eﬀect
of increased severity of punishments on the crime level.
2and show that increased sanctions may lead to reduced deterrence when plea bargain-
ing is taken into consideration. Plea bargaining is characterized by a guilty plea, in
which the defendant and the prosecutor agree to a division of the surplus created by the
savings generated by avoiding trial. This leads to a reduced sanction. When sanctions
are increased, a prosecutor who is socially benevolent, in the sense that minimizing
criminal activity is her goal, internalizes all of the eﬀects of plea bargaining. Conse-
quently, a benevolent prosecutor is able to take advantage of the increase in sanction
to reduce crime.
However, when prosecutors have diﬀerent objectives, this may no longer be the case.
Many lawyers and economists acknowledge the fact that prosecutors may have career
concerns. In particular, prosecutors may wish to signal their competence in order to
win re-election or to earn promotion. An easily measured signal of performance is the
conviction rate. Early critics of plea bargaining noted this potential. Raymond Moley
in 1928 noted:7
Equally important is the advantage which a plea of guilty gives to the prose-
cuting attorney. He is not compelled to carry through an onerous and protracted
trial. He does not run the risk of losing his case in the trial court. He runs no
risk of having to oppose an appeal to a higher court in case he wins the trial ...
What is much more important to the prosecutor is the fact that in such records
as most prosecutors make of the work which they have performed, a plea of guilty
of any sort is counted as a conviction, and when he goes before the voters for
re-election he can talk in large terms about securing convictions when, in real-
ity, these ‘convictions’ include all sorts of compromises. The district attorney’s
“record”, as he usually interprets it to the public, rests upon the ratio of convic-
tions to acquittals and means as much to him as a batting average means to a
baseball player.
This concern with ‘batting averages’ does not seem to have diminished.8 As i m p l e
7 Moley (1928), p. 103.
8 Rabin (1971) and Eisenstein (1978) show some interview evidence of this objective among
federal prosecutors. Albonetti (1987) shows that the decision to prosecute is made with
a preference to avoid uncertainty. Raghav, Ramseyer, and Rasmusen (2005) show that
appointed prosecutors have lower conviction rates than elected ones, suggesting that
high conviction rates may be believed to have an electoral reward.
3Google search on conviction rates yields many District Attorney’s webpages that report
information on conviction rates. For example, a website from the County of San Diego
reports:9
The District Attorneys Oﬃce is very proud of the fact that it has a 94.2
percent conviction rate - one of the highest in the State of California. This ﬁgure
is based upon the total number of felony cases ﬁled and the outcome of those
cases; that is, whether these cases were resolved by way of conviction (guilty plea
or guilty verdict), not guilty verdict, or dismissal. Oﬃcewide statistics for the
year 2005 show that there were 18,763 felony cases closed, 17,668 convictions, 31
verdicts of not guilty, and 1,064 dismissals.
These statistics are easy to present and interpret and are often used by prosecutors as
a measure of their performance and eﬀectiveness.
Of course, prosecutors are not solely concerned with conviction rates. However, they
may value both a traditional deterrence objective and the more easily evaluated con-
viction rate objective.10 When prosecutors have these motivations and are faced with
a higher sanction, they will want to increase trial eﬀort in order to increase conviction
probabilities. Given that prosecutorial resources are limited, in order to provide more
trial eﬀort, the prosecutor must plea bargain a larger fraction of cases. However, each
plea bargain entails a reduced sanction, oﬀsetting the beneﬁt of the increased sanc-
tion. In this environment, as long as sanctions cannot be raised to the point where no
one commits any crime (avoiding the limiting case), raising sanctions can lead to an
increase in crime levels.
Instead of increasing the legislated sanction, a better strategy for reducing crime may
be to increase the expenditure on prosecutorial services. Increasing this expenditure
reduces the pressure to oﬀer attractive plea bargains for administrative reasons. An
interesting alternative policy to mitigate this problem, is the introduction of procedural
9 See the webpage, http://www.sdcda.org/prosecuting/conviction.php
10 Boylan (2005) shows that prosecutors career outcomes are not aﬀected by conviction
rates, but rather by the length of prison sentences. In this paper, we will suppose that
prosecutors care about both of these objectives and look at the consequences of varying
the relative intensity of these objectives.
4policies that limit the number or attractiveness of plea bargains like the ones discussed
at the beginning of this paper.
In the next section of the paper, we discuss the basic model and derive agent behav-
ior. We, then, in section 3, characterize the equilibrium level of crime in our simple
economy. Section 4 deals with the eﬀects of increasing sanctions. Lastly, we discuss
the implications for the prosecutor’s oﬃce of restricting the resources devoted to trial.
All proofs are in the appendix.
2. The Model
There is a measure of agents indexed by their criminal aptitude θ ∈ [0,1], which is
uniformly distributed.11 More able agents are assumed to extract more rents from
criminal activities. There is one possible criminal activity which has a payoﬀ of θ.I f
agents do not commit a crime, they receive a reservation utility which is normalized
to zero.
If an agent commits a crime, he will be caught with probability µ>0. For simplicity,
we assume that no innocent agents are charged.12 We assume that prosecutors cannot
observe θ; and, therefore, no sentences or plea bargains are conditioned on the agent’s
ability. The expected sanction from going to trial is the product of the legislated
sanction S and the probability of conviction.13 The probability of conviction is given by
11 This criminal aptitude can simply be interpreted as the gain from a speciﬁc crime an
individual contemplates committing, or the gain an individual with a speciﬁc criminal
ability gets from a certain type of crime.
12 This assumption allows us to abstract from information based arguments about the guilt
of a defendant in designing plea bargaining. This type of arguments has been widely
investigated in the literature, for example see Grossman and Katz (1983). In reality, a
defendant does not have to be objectively innocent to avoid conviction. For example, the
prosecutor could fail to turn exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady vs. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1969), or the defense may show that the police conducted an unreasonable
search or seizure. Eﬀort by both the defendant and the prosecutor can consequently
aﬀect the probability of conviction, even if the defendant is in fact guilty.
13 Since we want to discuss judicial procedures, we assume that there is always some level
5P(e), where e is the eﬀort provided by the prosecutor in charge of the case. Naturally,
P  (e) > 0a n dP   (e) < 0. The cost of going to trial for the prosecutor is simply the
eﬀort level e. With some probability λ, the defendant is oﬀered a plea bargain by
the prosecutor’s oﬃce. The resulting sentence B is the outcome of a bargaining game
between the defendant and the prosecutor’s oﬃce.




(1 − λ)P(e)S + λB

.
Let ¯ θ denote the agent who is indiﬀerent between committing a crime and receiving
his reservation utility. This agent is implicitly deﬁned by
¯ θ = µ

(1 − λ)P(e)S + λB

. (1)
All agents with θ ≥ ¯ θ choose to commit a crime, and all agents θ<¯ θ choose not to.
Therefore, 1 − ¯ θ is the total proportion of criminals in the economy.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, all agents choose whether or not to
commit a crime. A fraction µ of all criminals is arrested. The prosecutor’s oﬃce
chooses to bargain with λ of the arrested criminals subject to its budget constraint.14
If an agreement is reached during plea bargaining, the defendant pleads guilty and the
agreed sanction B is imposed. The cost of such a plea for the prosecutor’s oﬃce is
assumed to be zero. If the two parties are unable to reach an agreement, the case is
transferred to court. The court process is simple, the assigned prosecutor chooses her
eﬀort levels e. The defendant is found guilty with probability P(e), in which case the
sanction S is imposed.
The prosecutors aim to maximize the expected average sanction net of the eﬀort cost,
of crime in equilibrium. Assuming that S<1 is one way to ensure it.
14 We assume that the prosecutor’s oﬃce takes the level of crime as given when choosing
the level of plea bargaining.
6plus a weighted conviction rate δP(e), where δ captures the degree of this incen-
tive. In previous work, prosecutors have been modeled as maximizing total expected
sentences15 or social welfare.16 However, if a prosecutor maximizes total sentences,
she may have an incentive to promote crime, thus, having more criminals to prose-
cute. A prosecutor maximizing average expected sentences net of the eﬀort cost can
be thought of as having one of two motives. First, the prosecutor may be maximizing
deterrence net of its cost and, therefore, acting in the social interest. Second, the
prosecutor may be self-interested and associate professional status and electoral suc-
cess with being “tough on crime”. We allow the prosecutor to independently also care
about their conviction rate in trial cases. Overall, the prosecutor’s oﬃce is resource
constrained, which can be interpreted as the total time or ﬁnancial resources. When
the prosecutor’s oﬃce chooses the proportion of defendants to enter into plea bargains
with, it faces the following problem:
max
λ
(1 − λ)P(e)S + λB − e(1 − λ)µ[1 − ¯ θ]+δP(e)
Subject to M ≥ µ(1 − ¯ θ)(1 − λ)e ;1 ≥ λ ≥ 0
where µ(1 − ¯ θ) is the number of captured criminals, M is the available budget, and
(1 − λ)e is the total trial cost. Before being able to solve for the optimal λ, we need
to know the level of eﬀort e each prosecutor will provide in court and the sanction B
that will be negotiated during the plea bargaining stage.
2.1 Trial
At the trial stage, the game is very simple. Given the budgetary constraint and the
concavity of P(e), the prosecutor’s eﬀort level e at each trial is chosen as a function
of λ. More precisely the level of eﬀort at each trial is given by:
15 For example, the prosecutor maximizes total expected sentences in Landes (1974).
16 As in Grossman and Katz (1983) and Reinganum (1988).
7e(λ)=
M
µ(1 − λ)(1 − ¯ θ)
. (2)
Obviously, an increase in the number of cases that are plea bargained allows the
prosecutor to devote more eﬀort in each trial, so e(λ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nλ.
2.2 Plea Bargaining
A plea bargain is the outcome of a bargaining game between a defendant and a pros-
ecutor. Entering into a plea bargain results in the defendant pleading guilty and
receiving an agreed upon sentence, which we denote by B. A plea bargain divides the
surplus generated by foregoing trial. In particular, the defendant beneﬁts from having
his sentence reduced: P(e(λ),S)S − B. The prosecutor loses from receiving a lower
expected sentence, but saves the cost of the trial, e(λ).
We assume a Nash bargaining solution, where the resulting plea bargain is given by
B = P(e(λ))S − αe(λ), where α represents the defendant’s bargaining power and
therefore the share of the bargaining surplus he receives. The bargaining surplus in
this case is a result of the cost savings generated by avoiding trial. Note that an
increase in the legislated sanction S leads directly to an increase in the plea bargained
sanction B.
2.3 Trials versus Pleas
When choosing how many cases to plead versus to take to trial, the prosecutor’s oﬃce
is able exploit the trade oﬀ that exists between the number of plea bargains and the
amount of eﬀort at each trial. In this section, we illustrate how this trade-oﬀ operates.
The prosecutor, according to the budget constraint, chooses a proportion of cases to
plea bargain, and ultimately the level of eﬀort for each court case.
The prosecutor takes the level of crime as given and maximizes her objective function





The optimal amount of plea bargaining (and implicitly the level of eﬀort in each court
case provided by the prosecutor) is given by:




Equation (3) deﬁnes the fraction of cases that are resolved by guilty pleas. Increasing
the number of plea bargains oﬀered has a direct negative impact on deterrence because
plea bargaining reduces the expected sanction by αe(λ). However, when the prosecu-
tor’s oﬃce chooses to plea bargain more, it relaxes its resource constraint and increases
the probability of conviction in the cases that ultimately do go to court. This increase
in deterrence is captured by the second term. Using the fact that e (λ)=e(λ)/(1−λ),
we can deﬁne λ(S) as the proportion of cases the prosecutor’s oﬃce pleas with for a
given sanction S,w h e r eλ(S)i sg i v e nb y
P   (e(λ(S)))[S + δ]=α. (4).
Note that when a prosecutor is more concerned with her “batting average” (δ>0),
she will plea bargain with an even larger fraction of cases. By bargaining more, the
prosecutor can put extra eﬀort into the remaining cases that go to court.
Lemma 1: The proportion of cases resolved through plea bargaining is an increasing
function of the sanction S.
When the sanction S increases, the marginal beneﬁt of increasing the probability of
winning a case for the prosecutor goes up. So, the prosecutor prefers to plea more
often and beneﬁt from the higher probability of winning cases taken to trial.
93. Equilibrium Level of Crime
The equilibrium level of crime in this economy can be solved by using agents’ optimal
behaviors described in the previous section. Given a number of cases, the prosecutor’s
oﬃce will plea bargain with a proportion λ(S). The eﬀort in each trial case is given
by e(S)= M
µ[1−λ(S)](1−¯ θ). For cases resolved by plea bargain, the reduced sanction is
B = P(e(s))S−αe(S). Finally, only individuals with θ>¯ θ choose to a commit crime,
where ¯ θ = µ[P(e(s))S − λ(S)αe(S)]. The equilibrium level of crime 1 − ¯ θ(S)s a t i s ﬁ e s
all of these conditions.
Proposition 1: There exists a unique equilibrium with a positive crime rate 1− ¯ θ(S),
given by the following equation:
¯ θ(S)=µ[P (e(S))S − αe(S)] + α
M
1 − ¯ θ(S)
. (5)
4. Consequences of Increasing the Sanction
Obviously, an increase in the legislated sanction directly changes the expected outcome
of a trial, as well as the resulting sanction from a plea bargain. It also alters the
likelihood of trial relative to a guilty plea. Through these avenues, it inﬂuences the
crime rate, 1 − ¯ θ(S). Only if ¯ θ(S) is negatively related to the sanction S does an
increase in the trial sanction S lead to an increase in the overall level of crime 1 − ¯ θ.
Proposition 2: The crime rate is increasing with the legislated sanction S if the
prosecutor is suﬃciently career concerned (δ>0).
When the prosecutor is benevolent (δ = 0), there is no conﬂict between her objective
and deterrence maximization. Therefore, a benevolent prosecutor cannot do worse
when the sanction increases. She will only increase plea bargaining to the point where it
maximizes crime reduction. However, if the prosecutor is concerned with her conviction
rate, this result may change. Recall that an increase in the sanction will lead to a higher
level of plea bargaining when the prosecutor has career concerns. This is due to the
10fact that, as S increases, increasing trial eﬀort is desirable. Therefore, it is necessary
to free up resources. This high rate of plea bargaining can have a detrimental eﬀect
on deterrence when plea bargaining is present.
Obviously, when this eﬀect is larger, plea bargaining is more likely to be detrimental.
However, other aspects of the judicial system contribute to this result. For example,





∂S ) and the eﬀectiveness of such increase in eﬀort (P  (·)) also contribute to
this result. Intuitively, when eﬀort is very eﬀective at trial, career concerned prose-
cutors have a larger beneﬁt from plea bargaining. This translates into too few cases
going to trial, and to lower overall expected sentences. Through this avenue, the direct
eﬀect of increasing the legislated sanction is entirely undone, and overall deterrence
falls.
5. Conclusion
Given the observation that some agents receive plea bargains, this model suggests that
increasing sanctions may lead to increased incentives to commit crime. Although it is
diﬃcult to discern how many plea bargains are made solely for the purpose of conserv-
ing resources, the large proportion of cases resolved in this manner suggests that this
is an important factor. Obviously, this model lacks important features of the judicial
process that motivate the use of plea bargains. Most importantly, we do not incor-
porate risk aversion which is a primary reason why prosecutors and defendants reach
agreements. In this model, we also do not consider the problems of asymmetric infor-
mation about agents’ guilt or innocence. If some agents are innocent, they might want
to go to trial in order to separate themselves from guilty defendants as in Grossman
and Katz (1983). Prosecutors and defendants could also possess diﬀerent information
about the strength of the prosecutor’s case, as discussed in Reinganum (1988). Baker
and Mezzetti (2001) also consider a game of asymmetric information. But even if
all those features were to be introduced, it would still be true that a reduction in
11deterrence could be driven by an increase in trial costs and binding budgets.
Policies to limit plea bargaining have been implemented. For example, thirteen US
states have done so for DWI infractions. Another method of deterring crime may be
to increase the budgets and number of prosecutors or to even decrease the legislated
criminal sanctions. However, given the current judicial system, where less than 10%
of cases go to trial, the budget necessary to take every case to trial seems infeasible.
Alternatively, one could reduce the cost of trial directly: for example, by reducing the
burden of proof. However, this possibility has other obvious disadvantages in a system
where guilt is to be ascertained.
Mandatory minimum sentences, which are currently used for many drug and violent
crimes, may serve as a method of increasing criminal sanctions without increasing the
costs of a trial. In these cases, the cost of a trial may not be increasing in the sanction,
since the quantity of evidence that must be prepared and presented is limited to only
a few dimensions (i.e. the quantity of drugs possessed).
“Three strikes” laws, like those in California, where a third felony conviction results in
life–imprisonment may reduce the beneﬁts of plea bargaining to career criminals. Even
if the defendant is risk–neutral, and the expected sentence from plea bargaining is less
than that of going to trial, the defendant may not wish to plead guilty to a felony, and
may rather risk being sentenced to a much more severe sanction in the hope of being
found innocent. The beneﬁt to being found innocent is now much higher than in a
system where punishment increases more slowly following previous guilty decisions.
This paper also highlights a weakness of relying on conviction rates as a measure of
prosecutor performance. Of course, too much concern with high conviction rates has
obvious disadvantages in a system where prosecutors are relied upon to ascertain guilt.
However, even in this environment where all defendants are guilty, such a reliance on
conviction rate measures may have a perverse eﬀect on the level of deterrence by
encouraging too many and too generous plea bargains.
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147. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Equation (4) determines λ(s), and comparative static analysis




P  (·)[1 − λ(S)]
(S + δ)P   (·)e(λ(S))
.
The expression above is positive.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :The crime rate in this economy is given by
1 − ¯ θ(S)=1− µ[P (e(S))S − λ(S)αe(S)], (A1)
and from the prosecutor’s budget constraint we know that λ(S)=1− M
µ[1−¯ θ(S)]e(S).
Consequently, the equilibrium level of ¯ θ(S) solves the following equation:
¯ θ(S)=µ[P (e(S))S − αe(S)] + α
M
1 − ¯ θ(S)
. (A2)
First, note that the left hand side of this equation is an increasing linear function of
¯ θ, while the right hand side is an increasing convex function of ¯ θ. More importantly,
note that at ¯ θ = 0, the left hand side of (A2), is smaller than the right hand side. This
implies that the cost of being a criminal for the least able agent always exceeds the
beneﬁt. Since we assumed that S<1, the left hand side of (A2) is larger than the
right hand side for θ = 1, implying that the beneﬁt of committing crime for the most
able agent always exceeds the cost. Consequently, there exists one equilibrium with
positive crime rate. Given that we have a unique equilibrium, the stability condition
will be satisﬁed. It is to say that the slope of the right hand side of (A2) is smaller
than one. This property will be used in the proof of proposition 2.




P(·)+[ P  (·)S − α]
∂e(S)
∂S
1 − α M
[1−¯ θ(S)]2
.
First, note that given the stability condition, the denominator has to be positive. Using
the prosecutor’s ﬁrst order condition, we can easily show that [P  (·)S −α]=−δP (·).




P(·) − δP (·)
∂e(S)
∂S
1 − α M
[1−¯ θ(S)]2
.
Since the crime rate is given by 1− ¯ θ,i fδP (·)
∂e(S)
∂S >P(·), then the crime rate would
be an increasing function of the sanction S. A necessary condition for crime to be
increasing in S is that δ be large enough.
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